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Introduction 
The East China Sea is categorized as a semi-enclosed sea in East Asia under the general 
definition set forth in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC).1 
Accordingly, “enclosed or semi-enclosed sea” is defined as “a gulf, basin, or sea surrounded 
by two or more States and connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet or 
consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or 
more coastal States”.2 It covers about 480,000 sq mi (1,243,190 sq km) and is bounded by the 
islands of Cheju (north), Kyushu (northeast), Ryukyu (east) and Taiwan (south) and by China 
(west).3 It is a marginal sea with a wide continental shelf, and its average depth is 370 metres 
with the maximum of 2,719 metres. In recent years, the East China Sea is not quiet not only 
in its tidal waves or natural movements, but also in political and legal differences particularly 
between China and Japan. 
     With its ever increasing economic growth, China (PRC) is thirsty for energy particularly 
oil and gas so as to sustain its development. It became the world's second-largest net importer 
of crude oil and petroleum products in 2009 and the U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(EIA) projects that China will surpass the United States as the largest net oil importer by 
2014.4 The China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) – the third largest state-
owned oil company in China – is responsible for offshore oil and gas exploration and 
production. It has been operating petroleum activities in the South China Sea, mainly 
adjacent to Hainan Island and Hong Kong, such as Weizhou, Huizhou, Lufeng, Dongfang 
                                                            
*It is acknowledged that this chapter is a variant version of a chapter by the same author published in Clive 
Schofield, Young Kil Park and Leonardo Bernard (eds.), East China Sea: How to Build Confidence and Promote 
Cooperation (Korea: Korea Maritime Institute, 2017), 202-224.  
1 The LOSC was adopted in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea on 10 December 1982 
and entered into force on 16 November 1994. Text is printed in The Law of the Sea: Official Text of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with Annexes and Index (New York: United Nations, 1983).   
2 Art. 122 of the LOSC. 
3 “East China Sea”, in The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th Edition, Vol.3 (Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 
1984), at 756. 
4 US Energy Information Administration, “China”, Country Analysis, 4 February 2014, available at 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/China/china.pdf. 
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oil/gas fields. CNOOC had increased its production to 20 percent of China’s total petroleum 
production by 2010.5 
 
General Legal Framework 
The concept of Joint Development first appeared in international law in the 1970s. There are 
various definitions on Joint Development in relevant legal literature. An earlier definition was 
offered by Rainer Lagoni, a German scholar and he defined Joint Development as 
“cooperation between States with regard to the exploration for and exploitation of certain 
deposits, fields, or accumulations of non-living resources which either extend across a 
boundary or lie in an area of overlapping claims”.6 Gault defines Joint Development as “a 
decision by one or more countries to pool any rights they may have over a given area and, to 
a greater or lesser degree, undertake some form of joint management for the purpose of 
exploring and exploiting offshore minerals”.7 Another pioneering scholar in the field of Joint 
Development studies is William T. Onorato, who published an article in 1968 discussing the 
idea of joint development.8 A further article of the same title was published again in the same 
journal in 1977.9 His most important point is that the old doctrine that a potential common 
petroleum deposit should be directed to the preservation of the “unity of the deposit”, “or, 
more exactly, to unity of national ownership and exploitation authority over it” was out of 
date and such deposit can be accepted as joint property of several states under which it might 
lie.10 Though no definition on Joint Development is contained in these articles, the notion of 
the shared property, in particular concerning its apportionment, indicates the possibility of 
joint development between states concerned. Miyoshi even observed, the original idea of 
joint development can be traced back to as early as “1930s when studies and judicial cases on 
                                                            
5 For details, see Zou Keyuan, “China’s Governance over Offshore Oil and Gas Development and 
Management”, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol.35 (4), 2004: 339-364. 
6 See International Law Association, Report on Joint Development of Non-Living Resources in the Exclusive 
Economic Zone, 1988, at 2. 
7 I.T. Gault, “Joint Development of Offshore Mineral Resources – Progress and Prospects for the Future”, 
Mineral Resources Forum, Vol. 12 (3), 1988, at 275; cited in British Institute of International and Comparative 
Law, Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas: A Model Agreement for States for Joint Development with 
Explanatory Commentary (London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 1989), at 43. 
8 See William T. Onorato, “Apportionment of an International Common Petroleum Deposit”, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol.17, 1968, 85-101. 
9 See William T. Onorato, “Apportionment of an International Common Petroleum Deposit”, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol.26, 1977, 324-337. 
10 See Onorato, ibid., at 325. 
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joint petroleum development can be found in the United States”.11 However, being a modern 
concept in international law, Joint Development is relatively new. Furthermore, the 
definitions provided above have some limitations, either emphasizing on overlapping claims 
or on general cooperation without specifics.  
     Because of these, the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, having 
compared different definitions concerned, defines Joint Development as “an agreement 
between two States to develop so as to share jointly in agreed proportions by inter-State 
cooperation and national measures the offshore oil and gas in a designated zone of the seabed 
and subsoil of the continental shelf to which both or either of the participating States are 
entitled in international law”.12 This definition is broad enough to cover all relevant situations 
which Joint Development is needed and/or required. Generally speaking, the concept of Joint 
Development contains several characteristics: (a) it is an arrangement between two countries; 
(b) it is usually concerned with an overlapping maritime area; (c) it can be used as a 
provisional arrangement pending the settlement of the boundary delimitation disputes 
between the countries concerned; (d) it is designed to jointly develop the mineral resources in 
the disputed area or a defined area shared by two countries. In this sense, joint development is 
a most feasible mechanism to shelf the dispute so as to pave the way of cooperation pending 
the settlement of the territorial and/or maritime disputes over a certain sea area due to their 
overlapping claims.  
     It is necessary to differentiate the concept of joint development from similar concepts such 
as of unitization which straddles the same structure licensed to two oil companies or of joint 
venture which is established between, say, a Chinese enterprise and a foreign investor, though 
the detailed implementation of Joint Development will incorporate features of unitization 
and/or joint venture agreements. Furthermore, Joint Development carries special meaning and 
should not be misunderstood simply as something equivalent to joint cooperation either. 
Finally, while joint development is mainly applicable to the use of mineral resources, it is not 
excluded in the area of marine living resources management, as manifested in some existing 
cases, such as the Colombia-Jamaica Treaty of 12 November 1993 which set up a “Joint 
Regime Area” for joint management, control, exploration and exploitation of the living and 
                                                            
11 Masahiro Miyoshi, “The Joint Development of Offshore Oil and Gas in Relation to Maritime Boundary 
Delimitation”, Maritime Briefing, Vol.2 (5), 1999, at 1. According to Miyoshi, joint development is defined as 
“an inter-governmental arrangement of a provisional nature, designed for functional purpose of joint 
exploration for and/or exploitation of hydrocarbon resources of the seabed beyond the territorial sea”, ibid., 
at 3. 
12 British Institute of International and Comparative Law, supra note 7, at 45. 
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non-living resources,13 and the Guinea-Bissau-Senegal Agreement of 14 October 1993 which 
covers not only oil and gas but also living marine resources.14 
     The LOSC provides a legal basis for joint development in disputed maritime areas 
pending the settlement of the maritime boundary delimitation. Articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) 
provide that pending agreement reached between them on the delimitation of the EEZ and 
continental shelf, the states concerned, in a spirit of understanding and cooperation, are 
required to “make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature 
and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final 
agreement.” This legal norm has been reflected in many existing cases and can apply to the 
East China Sea. However, the LOSC leaves other options open to the states concerned about 
whether they can enter into joint development agreements after the definite maritime 
boundary delimitation. It is recalled that as early as 1969 the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) touched on this issue in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases by stating that “if… the 
delimitation leaves to the Parties areas that overlap, there are to be divided between them in 
agreed proportions or failing agreement, equally, unless they decide on a regime of joint 
jurisdiction, use, or exploitation for the zone of overlap or any part of them”.15 Finally, it 
should be noted that peaceful resolution of international disputes is one of the fundamental 
principles in international law, as stipulated both in the Charter of the United Nations and the 
LOSC. Joint Development is one of the options for states to reach a peaceful resolution in the 
maritime domain.  “Provisional arrangements of a practical nature” are designed to promote 
interim regimes and practical measures that could pave the way for provisional utilization of 
disputed areas pending delimitation. Such arrangement constitutes an implicit 
acknowledgment of the importance of avoiding the suspicion of economic development in a 
disputed maritime area.16 
     In state practice, there are many precedents setting forth the joint development 
arrangements. The first of this kind was made between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in 1922, the 
earliest example of a joint development regime. Based on the 1922 Aqeer Agreement, the two 
countries were co-tenants in the Neutral Zone, holding shares equally and jointly in 
                                                            
13 See Miyoshi (1999), supra note 11, at 23. 
14 See Miyoshi (1999), supra note 11, at 37. 
15 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judgement of 20 February 1969, ICJ Report, 1969, at 53. 
16 Guyana v. Suriname, 17 September 2007, available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1147. 
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condominium and later on they consented to joint development by their concessionaires.17 It 
is summarized that there are generally three types of joint development schemes: (1) to be 
devised with the maritime boundary delimited, such as the Bahrain-Saudi Arabia Agreement 
concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf of 22 February 1958, the France-Spain 
Convention on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelves of the Two States in the Bay of 
Biscay of 29 January 1974, the Sudan-Saudi Arabia Agreement Relating to the Joint 
Exploration and Exploitation of the Natural Resources of the Seabed and Subsoil of the Red 
Sea in a Defined Area of the Two Countries in the Red Sea of 16 May 1974, and the Iceland-
Norway Agreement on the Continental Shelf between Iceland and Jan Mayen of 22 October 
1981; (2) for the purpose of unitizing hydrocarbon deposits which straddle the boundary line, 
such as the Norway-United Kingdom Agreement Relating to the Delimitation of the 
Continental Shelf between the Two Countries of 10 March 1965 and its subsequent 
agreements for the exploitation of Frigg Field gas and Statfjord Field and Murchison Field 
petroleum respectively; and (3) to be worked out with the issue of boundary delimitation 
shelved or kept unresolved, such as the Japan-Korea Agreement Concerning Joint 
Development of the Southern Part of the Continental Shelf Adjacent to the Two Countries of 
30 January 1974, the Malaysia-Thailand Memorandum of Understanding on the 
Establishment of a Joint Authority for the Exploitation of Resources of the Seabed in a 
Defined Area of the Two Countries in the Gulf of Thailand of 21 February 1979 (followed by 
the 1990 Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development Agreement), and the Australia-Indonesia 
Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation in an Area between the Indonesian Province of East 
Timor and Northern Australia of 11 December 1989 (now superseded by the 2002 Australia-
Timor Leste Agreement).18 The third type is linked to the provisional arrangements 
stipulations under the LOSC.  
     Some existing joint development models are conducive to the initiation and development 
of a similar one for the East China Sea. They actually exist all over the world from the North 
Sea Model to the Arabic Sea, and from Asia to Latin America.19 In the East Asian region, 
joint development is also a mode of bilateral cooperation between the countries concerned, 
                                                            
17 See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata & William T. Onorato, “Joint Development of International Petroleum Resources in 
Undefined and Disputed Areas”, in G.H. Blake, M.A. Pratt & C.H. Schofield (eds.), Boundaries and Energy: 
Problems and Prospects (London: Kluwer Law International, 1998), 436-437. 
18 Masahiro Miyoshi, “Is Joint Development Possible in the South China Sea?” in Mochtar Kusuma-Atmadja, 
Thomas A. Mensah and Bernard H. Oxman (eds.), Sustainable Development and Preservation of the Oceans: 
The Challenges of UNCLOS and Agenda 21 (Honolulu: the Law of the Sea Institute, University of Hawaii, 1997), 
613-614. 
19 For details of some existing cases, see Miyoshi (1999), supra note 11, 7-41. 
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such as the Japan-South Korean Arrangement in the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea in 
the 1970s, the Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development Area in the Gulf of Thailand and the 
Australian-Indonesia Joint Development Zone for the Timor Gap.20 
     What is more significant is the joint arrangement made by three countries – Malaysia, 
Thailand and Vietnam – in the Gulf of Thailand for their overlapping claimed sea areas 
where the three countries agreed in 1999 on establishing a regime of joint development. 
When the tripartite accord becomes effective, it will be the first multilateral agreement on 
joint development.21 The tripartite agreement, however, is based on two associated bilateral 
agreements either between Malaysia and Thailand or between Malaysia and Vietnam. In 
1979, Malaysia and Thailand signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to establish, 
on an interim basis of 50 years, a Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority “for the purpose of the 
exploration and exploitation of the non-living natural resources of the seabed and subsoil in 
the overlapping area”.22 More than ten years later, the two countries worked out the 
Constitution and other matters relating to the establishment of such an authority, which 
provides details of the operation in the joint zone.23 There are two striking characteristics in 
this joint development scheme: a powerful joint authority which decides on the plan of 
operation and the work program, to permit operations and conclude transactions or contracts, 
to approve and extend the period of exploration and exploitation, to approve the work 
program and budgets of the contractor, and inspect and audit the operator’s books and 
accounts;24 and the introduction of a production sharing system which include such terms and 
conditions as the duration of the contract not exceeding 35 years, the payment of 10% of 
gross production of petroleum by the contractor to the Joint Authority as royalty, 50% of 
gross production to be applied by the contractor for the recovery of costs, the remainder of 
gross production to be profit and divided equally between the Joint Authority and the 
contractor, all costs of operations to be borne by the contractor, and any dispute arising out of 
the contract to be referred to arbitration unless settled amicably.25 
                                                            
20 For details, see Shihata & Onorato, supra note 16, 438-441. 
21 Nguyen Hong Thao, “Vietnam and Joint Development in the Gulf of Thailand”, Asian Yearbook of 
International Law, Vol.8, 2003, 138-139. 
22 Text is reprinted in Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander (eds.), International Maritime Boundaries 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), Vol.1, 1099-1123. 
23 See Ibid. For further details, see David M. Ong, “The 1979 and 1990 Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development 
Agreements: A Model for International Legal Co-operation in Common Offshore Petroleum Deposits?” 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 14 (2), 1999, 207-246. 
24 See Article 7 of the 1990 Agreement. 
25 See Article 8 of the 1990 Agreement. 
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     On the other hand, Malaysia and Vietnam also signed a MOU in 1992 for joint 
development in the Gulf of Thailand. Accordingly Petronas and Petrovietnam are assigned to 
undertake respectively petroleum exploration and exploitation in the “defined area”. The 
arrangement between the two state-owned oil companies made in August 1993 established an 
8-member Coordination Committee to issue policy guidelines for the management of 
petroleum operations. This is different from the Thai-Malaysia model in which the Joint 
Authority is appointed directly by the governments. After the conclusion of the commercial 
arrangement in July 1997, oil has been extracted from the Bunga Kekwa field.26 Based on the 
bilateral arrangements, a tripartite mechanism has been gradually evolving for an overlapping 
maritime area. This practice shows that a form of multilateral joint development is possible 
and realistic.  
     More significant are agreements concerning maritime boundary delimitation since joint 
development is usually invoked in state practice as a provisional measure pending the 
settlement of boundary delimitation. In this sense, the 2000 Agreement on the Maritime 
Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin between China and Vietnam is notable. In 
addition to the settlement of the maritime boundary issue in the Gulf of Tonkin permanently, 
it reflects the idea of joint development of mineral resources in the gulf as it provides that  
In case any single geophysical structure of oil and gas or other mineral deposits 
straddles the demarcation line as provided in Article 2 of this Agreement, the Parties 
shall, through friendly consultation, reach an agreement on develop the structure or 
deposit in the most effective way as well as on equal sharing of the profits resulting 
from the development.27  
The above existing experiences in formulating joint development mechanisms no doubt help 
to establish a similar arrangement for the disputed areas in the East China Sea.  
 
Legal Positions on the Law of the Sea 
At the domestic level, China has taken several legislative moves in response to the 
implementation of the LOSC. In 1992 China promulgated the Law on the Territorial Sea and 
                                                            
26 See Nguyen Hong Thao, supra note 21, at 145. 
27 Article 7 of the 2000 Boundary Agreement. An unofficial English version of this Agreement is attached to Zou 
Keyuan, “Sino-Vietnamese Agreement on the Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin”, Ocean 
Development and International Law, Vol.36, 2005, 13-24. 
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the Contiguous Zone28 which has improved the territorial sea regime established under the 
1958 Declaration on the Territorial Sea. China has set its territorial sea at a breadth of 12 nm 
and the contiguous zone of 24 nm, measuring from the coastal baselines. This law applies to 
all of China, including Taiwan and the various islands located in the China seas.  
     Another basic marine law is the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental 
Shelf which was adopted by the National People's Congress in 1998.29 This law is designed 
to guarantee China’s exercise of sovereign rights and jurisdiction over its EEZ and 
continental shelf, and to safeguard China's national maritime rights and interests. According 
to this law, China's EEZ is the area beyond and adjacent to China's territorial sea, extending 
up to 200 nautical miles from baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured. As for China’s continental shelf, it comprises the sea-bed and subsoil of the 
submarine areas that extend beyond China's territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation 
of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured 
where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance.30 It is 
interesting to note that although the provision to define the EEZ is just a copy of the relevant 
provision of the LOSC, the provision regarding the continental shelf has something new with 
Chinese characteristics, that is, the emphasis on the natural prolongation of China's rights to 
the continental shelf, which bears strong implications for the delimitation of the continental 
shelf in the East China Sea.31 The Law further provides that EEZs and continental shelves 
with overlapping claims between China and the countries with opposite or adjacent coasts 
should be determined by agreement in accordance with the equitable principle on the basis of 
international law.  
     In May 1996 when ratifying the LOSC, China issued a declaration on its baselines. China 
uses the method of straight baselines to define the limits of its territorial sea around part of the 
mainland and the Xisha (Paracel) Islands.32 Meanwhile, China stated that it would announce 
remaining baselines of its territorial sea at another time.  
                                                            
28 The English version may be found in Office of Ocean Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International 
Environmental and Scientific Affairs, US Department of State, Limits in the Seas, No.117 (Straight Baselines 
Claim: China), July 9, 1996, 11-14.  
29 The Chinese text is reprinted in People's Daily (in Chinese), 30 June 1998. An English translation may be 
found in Law of the Sea Bulletin, No.38, 1998, 28-31. 
30 Article 2 of the Law on EEZ and Continental Shelf. 
31 Zou Keyuan, China’s Marine Legal System and the Law of the Sea (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005), at 94. 
32 Declaration on the Baseline of the Territorial Sea of the People’s Republic of China, 15 May 1996, see Office 
of Ocean Affairs, supra note 28, 9-10. 
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     In the Decision on the Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, China made a statement that:  
1. In accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, the People's Republic of China shall enjoy sovereign rights and jurisdiction over an 
exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles and the continental shelf. 
2. The People's Republic of China will effect, through consultations, the delimitation of 
the boundary of the maritime jurisdiction with the States with coasts opposite or adjacent 
to China respectively on the basis of international law and in accordance with the 
principle of equitability. 
3. The People's Republic of China reaffirms its sovereignty over all its archipelagos and 
islands as listed in article 2 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on the territorial 
sea and the contiguous zone, which was promulgated on 25 February 1992.33 
The above statement clearly shows the official position of China regarding the maritime 
boundary delimitation and reiterates its claims to the disputed islands in the East and South 
China Seas. In July 2013, President Xi Jinping expressed that his government was willing to 
shelve territorial disputes and carry out joint development in disputed waters.34 
     Japan took the similar domestic legislation process. In 1977 it adopted the Law on 
Territorial Sea and in 1996 the Law on EEZ and Continental Shelf. What it has done more 
than China is its promulgation of the Basic Ocean Law in 2007, which provides legal 
guidance for a unified and comprehensive ocean policy and administration.35 Regarding 
maritime boundary delimitation with neighbouring countries, Japan has advocated the 
application of the median line as a delimitation line for the EEZ and the continental shelf in the 
absence of an agreed line with the opposite country. This is reflected in its 1996 EEZ Law.36 
     The above legal positions have direct impact on the negotiation of any maritime cooperative 
mechanisms including schemes for joint development in the East China Sea. 
 
                                                            
33 The declaration is available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm#China%20after%20ratifi
cation.  
34 See “China Willing to Pursue Joint Development in Disputed Waters”, 31 July 2013, available at 
http://www.voanews.com/content/china-willing-to-pursue-joint-development-in-disputed-
waters/1713906.html.  
35 A Chinese translated version is available at China Oceans Law Review, 2008, No.1, 128-133. 
36 See Article 1 (2) and Article 2 (2) of the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf (Law 
No.74 of 1996), Law of the Sea Bulletin, No.33, 1997, 94-95.  
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Korea-Japan Joint Development Agreement 
The Japanese-South Korean joint development arrangement was the first as such in East Asia. 
The arrangement was based on several agreements signed between the two countries. It is 
significant in state practice since it represents the first application of the idea of joint 
development of offshore oil where the parties failed to agree on boundary delimitation.37 
Under the agreement, concessionaires who are authorized by the two respective governments 
have an undivided interest with respect to each of the nine defined sub-zones, and one 
operator is chosen from among the concessionaires so authorized for a particular sub-zone.38 
However, the “operator formula” which shifts applicable law to the operator from Japan to 
Korea or vice versa brings inconveniences to the operator when it transfers its work from one 
sub-zone to another sub-zone. The agreement establishes a Joint Commission as a 
consultative body to implement the agreement.  
     China (PRC) strongly protested this “joint development” arrangement and condemned it 
as an encroachment on China’s sovereignty.39 It was regarded by China as invalid, illegal and 
no binding force on a third state.40 On the other hand, China stated that the method of 
delimiting the continental shelf areas in the East China Sea should be determined by 
consultation between all the countries concerned. While it is not clear whether by that 
statement China meant a trilateral consultation, it could be interpreted as suggesting a 
multilateral approach which would be conducive to similar consultations for the South China 
Sea disputes.41 There is an interesting background to this approach. Originally the Taiwan 
Chinese were involved in the discussions of possible joint development in the East China 
Sea. In November 1970, a Japan-South Korea-ROC Liaison Committee was formed and later 
this organization was renamed as the Sino-Japanese-Korea Joint Committee for Ocean 
Development Research. However, this cooperation initiative ended in September 1972 when 
Taipei withdrew from the committee in the wake of Tokyo’s recognition of Beijing.42 Should 
any arrangement have been made between the three sides, it would have generated strong 
                                                            
37 Miyoshi (1999), supra note 11, at 1.  
38 Miyoshi, ibid., at 12. 
39 See the Statement of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 February 1974, reprinted in Law Department of 
Peking University (ed.), Collected Materials on the Law of the Sea (Beijing: People’s Press, 1974) (in Chinese), at 
88.  
40 See Zhao Lihai, Studies on the Law of the Sea (Beijing: Peking University Press, 1996) (in Chinese), at 55. 
41 See Masahiro Miyoshi, “International Maritime Boundaries and Joint Development: A Quest for a 
Multilateral Approach”, in G.H. Blake, M.A. Pratt & C.H. Schofield (eds.), supra note 17, at 465. 
42 Hurng-yu Chen, “The Prospects for Joint Development in the South China Sea”, Issues and Studies, Vol.27 
(12), 1991, at 122. 
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repercussions in East Asia, both legally and politically. One of the reasons why China (PRC) 
strongly protested the bilateral arrangement between Japan and South Korea may be 
attributed to the early involvement of the Taiwanese side.   
     There has to date no discovery of commercially viable hydrocarbons. 
 
China-Japan Principled Consensus 
In the East China Sea, China and Japan discussed the possibility of joint development of 
petroleum resources in the disputed areas. After China began to explore the Chunxiao gas 
field, Japan expressed its discontent and accused China of encroaching upon Japan’s rights in 
the East China Sea. The two sides held their consultation on 25 October 2004. At the sixth 
round of consultation in July 2006, the two sides reached a consensus to establish a maritime 
hotline communication mechanism in dealing with unexpected matters.43 During the 
following consultation, China put forward two proposals on joint development in the East 
China Sea but Japan only considered the one in the northern sea area.44  
     A consensus agreement was reached in June 2008 regarding joint development in the East 
China Sea after 11 rounds of negotiation (see Table 7.1). Accordingly, the agreed consensus 
includes (a) bilateral cooperation in the East China Sea and turning it into a sea of peace, 
cooperation and friendship; (b) joint development in the East China Sea and a small patch of 
joint development zone has been identified; a block of about 2,600 sq km that straddles the  
median line claimed by Japan and (c) participation of Japanese legal person in the 
development of Chunxiao Oil and Gas Field in accordance with Chinese laws.45  The 
conclusion of this agreement is in line with the spirit and provisions of the LOS Convention 
which encourages States concerned to work out provisional arrangements including joint 
development agreement pending the settlement of their maritime boundary disputes. 
However, the designated maritime zone for joint development is just a small patch and China 
is currently reluctant to go further with the implementation of this consensus agreement. 
                                                            
43 “China and Japan reached the principle consensus on establishing maritime hotline”, available at 
http://world.people.com.cn/GB/4572649.html. 
44 “Japan consider accepting the proposal on joint development in the northern sea area in the East China 
Sea”, 15 May 2006, available at http://world.people.com.cn/GB/1029/42354/4371017.html. 
45 “China, Japan reach principled consensus on East China Sea issue”, 18 June 2008, available at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-06/18/content_6774860.htm. See Gao Jianjun, “A Note on the 
2008 Cooperation Consensus Between China and Japan in the East China Sea”, Ocean Development and 
International Law, Vol.40, 2009, 291-303. 
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     A tentative agreement was scheduled to be finalised in September 2013. However, when 
the China-Japan political relations soured over the collision of a Chinese fishing vessel with a 
Japanese Coast Guard vessel, China asked for an indefinite postponement of the joint 
development agreement signing. While China still favors joint development, it has expressed 
that the resumption of talks on gas development would require Japanese concessions on 
bilateral issues, such as the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands.  
 
Implications of Fishery Agreements for Joint Development  
Since the broadest width of the East China Sea is less than 400 nm, the whole sea area 
becomes EEZs that are shared by China, Japan and Korea. The fishery relationship between 
the two sides inevitably needed a new adjustment. After several rounds of negotiation, the 
China and Japan finally reached agreement in September 1997 regarding the fishery 
management in the East China Sea.46 The new agreement came into force on 1 June 2000.  
     The agreement contains some significant provisions in response to the changed situation: 
(a) affirming the principle of fishery resources conservation and protection: Pursuant to the 
relevant provisions in the LOSC and environmental requirements from Agenda 21 and others, 
the Agreement contains as one of its purposes the establishment of a new fishery order in 
accordance with the LOSC, conserving and utilising rationally marine living resources of 
common concern, and maintaining the normal operation order at sea. Both sides agree to 
cooperate to conduct scientific research in fishery and to conserve marine living resources.47 
Each should adopt necessary measures to ensure compliance by their nationals and fishing 
boats with the provisions of the Fishery Agreement and the conservation measures and other 
conditions provided for in the relevant laws and regulations of the other Party when they are 
engaged in fishery activities in the other’s EEZ, and should inform each other of such 
conservation measures and other conditions provided for in its relevant laws and 
regulations.48 (b) Providing reciprocal fishing rights: The Agreement applies to the EEZs of 
both countries. However, this does not include all the EEZs as the Agreement excludes the 
EEZ area south of 270N, and west of 125030’E in the East China Sea where Taiwan and the 
                                                            
46 Fishery Agreement between the People's Republic of China and Japan, 11 November 1997. An unofficial 
English translation is available in Zou Keyuan, Law of the Sea in East Asia: Issues and Prospects (London: 
Routledge, 2005), 175-180. 
47 Article10 of the Sino-Japanese Fishery Agreement. 
48 Article 4 of the Sino-Japanese Fishery Agreement. 
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disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are located. (c) Establishing the Provisional Measures Zone 
(PMZ): The Agreement creates the PMZ which is located in the middle of the East China 
Sea, 52 nm from the baselines of the territorial seas for the Chinese mainland coast and for 
the coast of the Ryukyu Islands with its northern limit on the parallel of 30040’N and its 
southern limit on the parallel of 270N. For conservation and quantity of fishery resources in 
the PMZ, both sides should adopt, based on decisions made by the Sino-Japanese Fishery 
Joint Committee, appropriate management measures in order to protect marine living 
resources from the harm of being overexploited. Each party should take administrative and 
other necessary measures for its nationals and fishing boats fishing in the PMZ, and should 
not impose administrative and other measures on nationals and fishing boats of the other 
Party in this water area. The establishment of a common fishery zone is a typical form of 
fishery cooperation for shared waters between any two countries. What is new is that the 
PMZ is the first such zone between China and Japan, though there was some kind of fishery 
cooperation between the two sides in history.  
     It is the first such agreement between China and its neighboring countries concluded after 
the establishment of the EEZ regime. It is a positive sign favoring joint development in 
marine mineral resources.   
 
Implications of Extended Continental Shelf for Joint Development  
Article 76 of the LOSC provides the criteria to determine the outer limit of the continental 
shelf up to 350 nm from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured or 100 nm from the 2,500 metre isobath: 
(i) a line delineated by reference to the outermost fixed points at each of which the 
thickness of sedimentary rocks is at least 1 per cent of the shortest distance from such 
point to the foot of the continental slope; or 
(ii) a line delineated by reference to fixed points not more than 60 nautical miles from the 
foot of the continental slope. 
The deadline for any submission from a coastal State, which became the party to the LOSC 
before 13 May 1999, on its outer continental shelf to the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf was 13 May 2009 (for East Asian countries, see Table 7.2). The 
Commission has a function to consider the data and other material submitted by coastal States 
concerning the outer limits of the continental shelf in areas where those limits extend beyond 
14 
 
200 nautical miles, and to make recommendations in accordance with Article 76 of the LOSC 
and the Statement of Understanding adopted on 29 August 1980 by the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea. Accordingly, Japan submitted its claim on 12 November 
2008.  
     On 6 February 2009, China lodged its objection to part of the Japanese submission 
regarding the Oki-no-Tori Shima, which, in China’s view, is in fact a rock which does not 
have any ground to claim continental shelf and requests the Commission not to take any 
action on the portions extended from that rock.49 South Korea shared the same view as the 
Chinese. However, the Commission is not the body which has the mandate to interpret the 
provisions of the LOSC as it reiterated that it had no role on matters relating to the legal 
interpretation of Article 121 of the Convention.50 On the other hand, if there is a dispute 
regarding a submission between different countries, the Commission has no mandate to 
review such a submission. 
     In addition, in May 2009 China and Republic of Korea both submitted respectively their 
Preliminary Information regarding their outer continental shelf in the East China Sea to the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in accordance with relevant provisions of 
the LOSC and other decisions made by the State Parties Conferences on the Law of the Sea.51 
The two countries have met the requirement and the submission of the preliminary 
information enables them to make their full submissions in a later time. Since such 
preliminary information indicates that both China and Korea’s outer continental shelf claims 
are in the East China Sea, it surely affects the interests of Japan who lodged protests with the 
United Nations. Furthermore, since they are both in the East China Sea, their claims are in 
conflict with each other as well. Following their Preliminary Information, China and South 
Korea submitted their outer continental shelf claims to the CLCS in the East China Sea in 
December 2012, which was objected by Japan.52 
                                                            
49 China’s Objection is available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/chn_6feb09_e.pdf. 
50 “Statement by the Chairman of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on the progress of 
work in the Commission”, CLCS/64, 1 October 2009, available at 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/536/21/PDF/N0953621.pdf?OpenElement. 
51 For details on China’s submission, see 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/preliminary/chn2009preliminaryinformation_englis
h.pdf and on Korea’s submission, see 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/preliminary/kor_2009preliminaryinformation.pdf. 
52 For details, see http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm. 
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      In April 2014, when the Chinese scientific investigation vessel “Science” was conducting 
its WPOS project around the Okinawa Trough, the Japanese Coast Guard asked the Chinese 
side to stop its activities as it is within the EEZ of Japan. However, according to China, the 
area is the natural prolongation of China’s continental shelf.53 It is indicated that the disputes 
concerning maritime boundary delimitation will continue. 
 
Third Party Interest 
Maritime issues are usually affecting the interest of third parties. In the East China Sea, China 
lodged a strong protest against the establishment of a Japan-Korea Joint Development Zone 
in the East China Sea in the 1970s. Likewise, the bilateral fishery agreement between China 
and Japan or between Japan and Korea also affected the interests of the other party as any 
bilateral arrangement may affect other relations and interests since they share the same sea 
area and use the same pool of marine living resources.  
     When Japan and Korea concluded their new fishery agreement, China considered that the 
Japan-Korea Fishery Agreement encroached on China’s sovereign rights over its EEZ in the 
border areas among the three countries and stated that China’s rights and interests in the EEZ 
and its fishery activities should not be subject to the limitation of that agreement. China 
maintained that the delimitation of the overlapping area among the three countries should be 
subject to consultations among the parties concerned, and exclusion of any party from the 
delimitation negotiations would be a violation of international law.54 On the other hand, 
South Korea also expressed its dissatisfaction with the Sino-Japanese Fishery Agreement by 
asking China and Japan to explain how they drew the northern-limit line of their joint fishing 
area. They should consult South Korea before reaching the agreement.55   
     On the other hand, it has to be realised that the fishery agreements either between China 
and Japan, or China and South Korea, or Japan and South Korea are bilateral ones. They have 
limitations and also do not completely cover the areas in the East China Sea and the Yellow 
                                                            
53 See “中国科考船在冲绳海槽遭日阻挠 与东海划界相关”, 15 April 2014, available at 
http://scitech.people.com.cn/n/2014/0415/c1057-24895134.html.  
54 “MF Spokesman expresses that the Japan-Korea Fishery Agreement encroaches on China’s sovereign rights 
over its EEZ”, People’s Daily (in Chinese), 23 January 1999. For further reference, see Fan Xiaoli, “Comments on 
the New Japan-Korea Fishery Agreement”, Ocean Development and Management (in Chinese), Vol.17 (1), 
2000, 68-70.  
55 See Chi Young Pak, “Resettlement of the Fisheries Order in Northeast Asia resulting from the New Fisheries 
Agreements among Korea, Japan and China”, Korea Observer, Vol.30 (4), 1999, 614-615. For other related 
reference, see Mark J. Valencia and Yong Hee Lee, “The South Korea-Russia-Japan Fisheries Imbroglio”, Marine 
Policy, Vol.26, 2002, 337-343. 
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Sea. Second, because of the bilateral nature, they may affect the interests of a third party as 
illustrated above in the Japan-Korean Fishery Agreement. Third, since bilateral agreements 
only regulate bilateral relations, fishing activities of third parties are outside any regulation. 
This is particularly true when Taiwan is concerned. Finally, many fishery resources in the 
East China Sea and the Yellow Sea are migratory species so that they belong to the same 
marine ecosystem. In that sense, the East Asian seas urgently need a regional and multilateral 
fishery arrangement which can be more effective to conserve and manage the fishery 
resources therein, and the newly concluded bilateral fishery agreements including the Sino-
Japanese one could be the basis for such regional cooperation.    
 
Taiwan Factor 
The Taiwan factor is deterrent to the smooth settlement of maritime disputes between China 
and some of its maritime neighbors. The 1997 Sino-Japanese Fishery Agreement deliberately 
avoided its coverage over the sea area surrounding Taiwan. On the other hand, Taiwan has 
raised the issue of overlapping areas in the Bashi Channel with the Philippines many times, 
hoping to reach an agreement. However, since the Philippines has recognized the PRC as the 
sole legitimate government of China and any such deal should be done with Beijing rather 
than with Taipei, the issue could not be easily resolved.56 Since all the neighboring countries 
recognize the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China, the delimitation negotiations 
must be conducted between those countries and the PRC without the involvement of Taiwan, 
the situation of the divided China remains a major obstacle to resolving the maritime 
boundary issues between China and its neighboring countries, particularly Japan and the 
Philippines.  
It is recalled that in 1974, Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka sought an international 
agreement for oil exploration and extraction around Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands which would 
include China and Taiwan. But there was little chance of the PRC agreeing to participate in 
any scheme in which Taiwan was included as an equal and independent partner.   
     On 10 April 2013 Japan and Taiwan concluded the Fishery Agreement after 16 rounds of 
talks since 1996. Some factors behind it include Ma Ying-jeou’s East China Sea Peace 
                                                            
56 See Fu Kuen-chen, "Dispute over the Detention of Fishing Vessels in the Law of the Sea Perspective", Youth 
Daily (in Chinese), 8 May 1989; and see also James T. Shen, Political and Legal Implications of the Concept of 
the Exclusive Economic Zone as Applied to the Republic of China (Taipei: Cross-Strait Interflow Prospect 
Foundation, 1998), at 30.   
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Initiative for Taiwan’s foreign policy; and Japan’s desire to place a wedge between China and 
Taiwan, preventing them from forming a united front against Japan’s interests.  
  On 5 August 2012, Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou put forward the 5-point East 
China Sea Peace Initiative.57 In September 2012, Taiwan issued the Implementing 
Guidelines. Point 5 is related to joint development as it proposes to “establish a mechanism 
for cooperation on exploring and developing resources in the East China Sea. 
 
A Possible Tripartite Agreement? 
As we know, there is no substantial progress concerning the bilateral arrangements for joint 
development in the East China Sea, either between Japan-South Korea or between China and 
Japan. In that circumstance, shall we consider an alternative to see the possibility of joint 
development in the East China Sea? Is it possible to work out a trilateral scheme for joint 
development among China, Japan and South Korea in the East China Sea? The advantage for 
a three-party cooperative mechanism is that it can accommodate the interests of all parties so 
as to avoid conflict of interests. But the disadvantage lies in the fact that such agreement is 
more difficult to work out and to be implemented 
     Existing experiences regarding trilateral cooperation include the South China Sea 
Experience and the Gulf of Thailand Experience: On 11 November 2003, the CNOOC and 
the Philippine National Oil Company agreed to jointly explore oil and gas in the South China 
Sea through the signing of a letter of intent between the two sides. A joint committee was set 
up to help select exploring areas in the South China Sea. They also agreed to establish a 
program to “review, assess and evaluate relevant geographical, geophysical and other 
technical data available to determine the oil and gas potential in the area”.58 Following this 
development, the State-owned oil companies of China, the Philippines and Vietnam 
(CNOOC, PetroVietnam and Philippine National Oil Company) signed an agreement on joint 
seismic exploration in a designated area (143,000 km2) of the South China Sea in March 
2005.59 However, after the first stage of the joint seismic survey, there has been no follow-up 
activity sponsored by the above three countries. Apparently, this preliminary joint 
                                                            
57 Full text is available at http://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/cp.aspx?n=A3C75D6CF8A0D021.  
58 “Chinese, Philippine firms join forces to look for oil in South China Sea”, Agence France Presse, 13 November 
2003. 
59 See “China, Philippines and Vietnam sign agreement to explore oil in the South China Sea”, LianheZaobao, 
15 March 2005, available at http://www.zaobao.com/gj/yx501_150305.html.  
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development scheme has encountered a political stalemate resulting from distrust and conflict 
of maritime interests.  
     As for the Gulf of Thailand Experience, it involves three countries, i.e., Malaysia, 
Thailand and Vietnam. According to the 1997 Thailand-Vietnam maritime boundary 
agreement, the two countries, together with Malaysia “shall enter into negotiations in order to 
settle the tripartite overlapping continental shelf claim area”. In 1999 the three countries 
agreed in principle on JD for a small overlapping area, but there is no progress so far. 
     As we know, China, Japan and Korea have already conducted trilateral cooperation. In 
addition to the ASEAN Plus Three institutional arrangement, the three countries signed a 
trilateral agreement on 16 December 2010.60 The Agreement is designed to contribute to the 
further promotion of cooperative relations among the three countries by providing support for 
the cooperation and management of the trilateral consultative mechanisms among the Parties 
and by facilitating the exploration and implementation of cooperative projects. It set up the 
Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat in Seoul in September 2011. Since 2010, the cooperative 
areas have covered disaster management, sustainable forest management, nuclear safety, and 
agricultural cooperation.61 It is reasonably assumed that with the expansion of the cooperative 
areas, the three countries could consider putting on the agenda the possible joint development 
in the East China Sea. 
 
Conclusion 
Joint development is mainly used as an interim measure pending the settlement of territorial 
and/or maritime disputes. Joint development can help stabilize the status quo of the disputed 
area, and may finally lead to a permanent dispute resolution. Unless such a resolution comes 
true, the disputes will be still there. It may on the other hand affect from time to time the 
effective implementation of any joint development arrangement.  
     It is clear that joint development between two states in the areas with multiple claims 
causes problems. It is called that when Japan and South Korea signed the joint development 
agreement for the East China Sea, it invited furious protests from China. The 2003 move 
                                                            
60 Full text is available at http://file.tcs-
asia.org/file_manager/files/tcs/1.%20Basic%20Documents/1.%20English/(2010.12.16)Agreement%20on%20th
e%20Establishment%20of%20the%20Trilateral%20Cooperation%20Secretariat.pdf.  
61 For details, see http://www.tcs-asia.org/dnb/board/list.php?board_name=3_5_1_documents_1.  
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between China and the Philippines regarding the possible joint development in the South 
China Sea met with protests from Vietnam. For that reason, joint development launched by 
only two claimant countries may not be an optimal option. On the other hand, joint 
development proposals at the bilateral level may not always welcome by relevant claimants. 
It is recalled that China once proposed to have a joint development with Vietnam for the 
Vanguard Bank where part of the area was a concession given to Crestone by China, but 
Vietnam rejected China’s proposal on the ground that the area is close to Vietnamese 
coastlines and within the limits of its continental shelf.62 
     All the states surrounding the East China Sea are demanding for energy for their economic 
growth. The increased energy consumption will definitely make the claimants to be more 
actively involved in oil and gas exploration and exploitation. This may cause more conflicts 
amongst the claimants if any of them conduct unilateral petroleum activities in the disputed 
maritime area. But it could create a window of opportunity for joint development when the 
claimants have realized that the unilateral act becomes a costly, disturbing and unfeasible 
option. All countries concerned should discuss a regional cooperation framework for joint 
development in the East China Sea. Once a form of joint development has been reached, 
relatively long-term peace and security in the East China Sea can be definitely guaranteed, 
which may positively lead to the final settlement of the territorial and maritime disputes in 
the area. 
 
 
Table 7.1: Rounds of Negotiation on the East China Sea Dispute 
 
Round                               Time                                                  Venue 
 
1                                     25 October 2004                                 Beijing 
2                                     30-31 May 2005                                  Beijing   
3                                     30 Sept. -1 Oct. 2005                           Tokyo  
4                                      6-7 March 2006                                  Beijing 
5                                      18 May 2006                                       Tokyo  
6                                      8-9 July 2006                                       Beijing  
7                                      29 March 2007                                     Tokyo 
8                                      25 May 2007                                        Beijing 
9                                      26 June 2007                                        Tokyo 
10                                   11 October 2007                                   Beijing 
11                                   14 November 2007                                Tokyo 
                                                            
62 Hasjim Djalal, “The Relevance of the Concept of Joint Development to Maritime Disputes in the South China 
Sea”, Indonesian Quarterly, Vol.27 (3), 1999, at 180. 
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Source: compiled by the author. 
 
 
Table 7.2: Dates of Submission in East Asia 
State                Dates           Submission 
 
Brunei              12/05/09      Preliminary Info 
China               11/05/09      Preliminary Info 
                         14/12/12      Partial Submission       
Indonesia         16/06/08      Partial Submission 
Japan               12/11/08      Full Submission     
Malaysia           06/05/09      Joint Submission 
Philippines        08/04/09      Partial Submission 
South Korea     11/05/09      Preliminary Info  
                         26/12/12      Partial Submission 
Vietnam           06/05/09      Joint Submission  
                        07/05/09      Partial Submission 
Source: compiled by the author. 
 
